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THE PSYCHOLOGY OF COMPETENCE
AND INFORMED CONSENT:
UNDERSTANDING DECISION-MAKING WITH
REGARD TO CLINICAL RESEARCH
Barry Rosenfeld*
INTRODUCTION
The role of psychology and related mental health disciplines in
the informed consent process has gradually evolved from an essen-
tially non-existent role into a central and important one. The im-
portance of informed consent as a mechanism for protecting
patient autonomy cannot be overstated. Both the ethical principals
of psychologists as well as countless legal decisions have empha-
sized the importance of patient autonomy.1 Rooted in the constitu-
tional right to privacy, the importance of autonomy as a guiding
principal in medical decision making (as in other forms of decision
making) has been well established and is essentially unchallenged.2
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1. For example, Ethical Principal D in the American Psychological Association's
Code of Conduct reads, "[p]sychologists accord appropriate respect to the fundamen-
tal rights, dignity, and worth of all people. They respect the rights of individuals to
privacy, confidentiality, self-determination, and autonomy, mindful that legal and
other obligations may lead to inconsistency and conflict with the exercise of these
rights." AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION OF PSYCHOLOGISTS ON ETHICAL
PRINCIPLES AND CODE OF CONDUCT § 2.08, at 1599-1600 (1992).
2. Ruth Faden and Tom Beauchamp write, "[t]he constitutional right to privacy
serves to protect individual autonomy; it has been invoked to prevent governmental
interference with various areas of personal health care decisionmaking from abortion
and contraception to treatment refusal." RUTH R. FADEN ET AL., A HISTORY AND
THEORY OF INFORMED CONSENT 38 (1986). Although Faden and Beauchamp distin-
guish the constitutional protection of autonomy from the common law informed con-
sent doctrine, they emphasize the concordance between these two paths, both of
which serve to protect an individual's right to make independent treatment decisions.
Id. at 39.
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I. INFORMED CONSENT
As is perhaps common knowledge for many clinicians and legal
scholars, the doctrine of informed consent requires three elements
to be present in order to validate medical treatment decisions.3
The decision must be knowledgeable (i.e., the treatment provider
must have disclosed relevant information to the prospective pa-
tient), voluntary (i.e., a decision made of the patient's own free
will), and competent (i.e., by an individual with an adequate level
of decision making ability). Although psychologists have been in-
volved in providing research and clinical expertise to virtually all
aspects of the informed consent process, psychology's role is most
important in determining whether the patient is competent to
make a treatment decision.4
The burden of the first element of informed consent, the "knowl-
edge" element, rests with the treating clinicians. Specifically, the
doctor must provide a reasonable amount of information regarding
the known risks and benefits of a recommended treatment, as well
as the risks and benefits of treatment alternatives. Not surpris-
ingly, the volume of information necessary to make an informed
decision varies depending on the nature and complexity of the de-
cision at hand. Furthermore, different patients will certainly differ
in the amount of information they desire. In general, however, a
standard has emerged that is consistent with numerous other areas
of the law: the "reasonable person" standard, or that amount of
information that the typical person would find adequate and/or
necessary to make such a decision. Although psychologists have
begun to use research tools to clarify the boundaries of the reason-
able person standard, literature has not yet focused squarely on
3. The essential elements of informed consent have emerged through a series of
civil law decisions beginning with the seminal New York case of Schloendorff v. Soci-
ety of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914) ("[e]very human being of adult years
and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body."). See
PAUL S. APPELBAUM ET AL., INFORMED CONSENT: LEGAL THEORY AND CLINICAL
PRACTICE 211-28 (1987); FADEN ET AL., supra note 2, at 22-43.
4. Although the terms "psychologists" and "psychology" are used throughout
this Essay, it should be noted that these terms are intended to encompass all mental
health professionals including psychiatrists and, to a lesser extent, social workers.
5. Early case law defined "reasonable" from the perspective of a typical cinician.
Namely, whether a typical clinician would have made essentially the same disclosure.
Since the seminal case of Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 773 (D.C. Cir. 1972),
however, courts increasingly look to the perspective of the patient to define what a
"reasonable" amount of disclosure includes. Courts increasingly ask whether a typi-
cal patient would want additional information disclosed.
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informed consent.6 Instead, most mental health research has ad-
dressed the impact of disclosed information on treatment decisions
or methods to improve comprehension and retention of disclosed
information.7
Voluntariness, the second element of informed consent, pertains
to the patient's decision making process. Individuals must be free
to make their own decisions without undue coercion from others.
Although studies of the patient's perceptions of coercion and the
factors that influence this perception have begun to emerge in the
psychology literature, this issue remains largely outside the domain
of psychology. 8 Instead, defining the contours of voluntariness oc-
curs primarily in the courts. Even so, no clear definitions or stan-
dards have been forthcoming.9
Competence, the final aspect of informed consent, is arguably
the most important element of consent. Although only recently
identified as a topic worthy of scientific scrutiny, the competence
question has increasingly attracted the attention of the psychologi-
cal sciences.' 0 While the burden of competence falls primarily
upon the decision maker, the clinician or researcher is responsible
for ensuring that this requirement has been satisfied." Impor-
tantly, the law presumes that every adult is competent to make de-
cisions for themselves unless proven otherwise; for many
individuals the burden of demonstrating competence may shift as a
practical matter, if not a legal one. Mentally ill, mentally retarded,
severely medically ill, and even healthy elderly adults share this
burden, in that many individuals perceive their competence to be
questionable. 2 This discussion focuses on three scenarios in which
6. See, e.g., Richard L. Wiener et al., Social Analytic Investigation of Hostile Work
Environments: A Test of the Reasonable Woman Standard, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
263, 263 (1995).
7. See GARY B. MELTON ET AL., PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATION FOR THE
COURTS: A HANDBOOK FOR MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS AND LAWYERS 352
(2d ed. 1997).
8. E.g., Steven K. Hoge et al., Perceptions of Coercion in the Admission of Volun-
tary and Involuntary Psychiatric Patients, 20 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 167, 167-74
(1997).
9. See MELTON ET AL., supra note 7, at 352.
10. See generally TOM GRISSo & PAUL S. APPELBAUM, ASSESSING COMPETENCE
TO CONSENT TO TREATMENT: A GUIDE FOR PHYSICIANS AND OTHER HEALTH PRO-
FESSIONALS 1-11 (1998).
11. Some writers, such as Celia Fisher, in this Volume, have suggested that this
standard places an unreasonable burden on patients in order to maintain their auton-
omy. Celia B. Fisher, A Goodness-of-Fit Ethic for Informed Consent, 30 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 159, 160 (2002). Such criticisms, however, have not been widely recognized.
12. See GRISSO & APPELBAUM, supra note 10, at 61-99.
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questions of competence, and the role of the mental health profes-
sional, play a central role.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS, CLINICAL ASSESSMENTS
Separating legal theory and clinical decision-making is necessary
to any discussion of legal and ethical principals guiding real-world
situations. Among the many crucial distinctions, few are as impor-
tant as the distinction between law and clinical practice. 13 Al-
though the decision-making capacity is clinical, determinations of
competence are legal conclusions that are based only partially on
clinical input. 4 Until a judge has declared an individual incompe-
tent, the law's presumption of competence remains.15 Moreover,
when determinations of incompetence are rendered, they are typi-
cally situation-specific, pertaining to only a single issue or decision
(although some individuals might be declared incompetent for a
broad range of purposes).' 6 Third, although the responsibility for
determining whether an individual is competent or incompetent
rests with a judge, formal proceedings to determine competence
are relatively rare. Instead, most questions about competence are
handled in a more informal manner.17 For example, the treating
clinician may simply defer to the wishes of an available family
member whenever a patient's competence is deemed inadequate.' 8
Finally, decisions regarding a patient's decision-making capacity
are often heavily influenced by the input and opinions of a psychol-
ogist or psychiatrist. 19 Most judges look toward mental health pro-
fessionals for guidance to determine when an impairment exists
and the extent of such an impairment.20 With these facts in mind,
exploring the role of psychologists in resolving what appears to be
complex ethical dilemmas becomes somewhat clearer.
13. See MELTON ET AL., supra note 7, at 3-25 (detailing the vastly differing world
views of lawyers as clinicians).
14. See id. at 129 ("The determination of a legal competency is a legal, not a
clinical, decision.").
15. See Bruce J. Winick, The MacArthur Treatment Competence Study: Legal and
Therapeutic Implications, 2 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & LAW 137, 152 (Mar. 1996)
("Modern legal approaches generally presume that people are competent to make
decisions unless they have adjudicated incompetent to do so.").
16. See, e.g., APPLEBAUM ET AL., supra note 3, at 82-83.
17. See id. at 90-93, 101-02.
18. See GRISSO & APPELBAUM, supra note 10, at 157 ("When patients have not
completed advanced directives, the usual recourse is to ask family members to make
decisions on their behalf.").
19. See, e.g., APPELBAUM ET AL., supra note 3, at 83-84.
20. MELTON ET AL., supra note 7, at 129; see APPELBAUM ET AL., supra note 3, at
104.
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The hypothetical cases that serve as the focal point for this analy-
sis have been previously described by Celia Fisher in this Volume
and are only summarized in brief here.21 These cases highlight sev-
eral of the issues noted above. The cases outline the parameters of
"competence" by illustrating the methodologies used in making
these determinations, distinguishing between ethical and legal is-
sues in the assessment of competence, and reviewing the proce-
dures for surrogate decision making when competence is deemed
impaired.
A. Case One-Deteriorating Competence Over the Course of
Study Participation
The first case described concerns a mentally ill woman, (whom
we refer to as "Alice"), who has agreed to participate in a research
study in which the standard treatment for her disorder, antip-
sychotic medications, are being withheld. In this scenario, the par-
ticipant's parents have requested that her participation be
terminated because of their fears that her condition has deterio-
rated. The dilemma facing the study's investigators is whether or
not to accede to the parents' wishes, or to respect Alice's initial
consent (which, conveniently, furthers their own research inter-
ests). This case is based on an actual study that generated signifi-
cant scrutiny in the public press and academic community, yet the
ethical and legal issues are somewhat more complex than the me-
dia accounts suggested. The primary issue in this case pertains to
the decision making competence of Alice, the schizophrenic wo-
man described in the vignette. As noted earlier, valid informed
consent requires that a decision maker be competent when they
provide consent.2 3 Assuming that Alice was informed of the na-
ture of this research study, or the risks and benefits of study partici-
pation, and was allowed to make the decision voluntarily, the issue
21. The order of presentation differs from that contained in Fisher, supra note 11,
at 167-70, but the essential "facts" of these cases remains identical. These same cases
have also been discussed elsewhere, although the focus of that discussion was differ-
ent. See generally Barry Rosenfeld, Competence to Consent to Research: Where Psy-
chology, Ethics and the Law Intersect, in The Forum, 12 ETHICS & BEHAV. 284, 284-87
(2002).
22. The study was entitled Developmental Processes in Schizophrenic Disorders
and was directed by Keith H. Nuechterlein and Michael Gitlin at U.C.L.A. Medical
Center. For an account and critic of this study, see Jay Horowitz, For the Sake of
Science, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 11, 1994, (magazine), at 16; see also James Willwerth, Did a
UCLA Experiment Deliberately Allow a Schizophrenic to Fall Into a Severe Relapse?,
TIME, Aug. 30, 1993, at 40.
23. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
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of her competence at the time she made the decision becomes cen-
tral. Although the research investigators are legally required to as-
sess Alice's decision making competence only when her
competence is in question, 24 the requirement is ambiguous in prac-
tice.2 5 Given the importance of Alice's decision to participate, per-
mitting a woman with a severe mental disorder to consent to a
potentially risky experiment without first assessing her capacity to
make a rational decision in this matter is clearly problematic.
Thus, it is probably (or hopefully, at least) reasonable to assume
that Alice's decision to consent to this study, at the time she
agreed, was a competent one.
Assuming Alice's consent was valid, the request on her parents'
part to discontinue their daughter's participation in the study has
no legal standing. 26 Furthermore, an assessment of her compe-
tence to continue participating is not necessary. Although her par-
ents are certainly free to convey their concerns to the study
personnel, their challenge to Alice's consent is not justified since
Alice's initial decision to participate was a competent one. First,
competence to consent to treatment is typically at issue only at the
outset of a study (or course of treatment), not an ongoing require-
ment of study participation .2  Alice was no doubt aware that she
might begin to show renewed psychotic symptoms, and she was
presumably aware of the risks and benefits of this outcome. More-
over, as a competent adult, Alice has the right to consent to or
refuse whatever medical treatments or research studies she
chooses. 28 Thus, even if the research investigators fear repercus-
sions from public scrutiny or legal action brought by Alice's par-
ents, they are actually obligated to follow Alice's request to
participate in the study as long as she continues to agree to
participate. 9
On the other hand, if Alice changes her mind and requests that
the study be discontinued, the situation becomes far more complex.
Although ethicists generally agree that even an incompetent per-
24. Special requirements are included in the regulations regarding competency to
consent to research. See MELTON ET AL., supra note 7, at 357; see also 45 C.F.R.
§ 46.111(b) (2001).
25. Most investigators would routinely assess the prospective patient's capacity to
consent in this situation. See generally MELTON ET AL., supra note 7, at 357.
26. In re K.K.B, 609 P.2d 747, 752 (Okla. 1980) (upholding autonomous decision-
making capacity of mentally ill person).
27. Id.
28. Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914).
29. In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64, 70 (N.Y. 1981).
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son should have to assent to participate in any research study of-
fered, even if they are not capable of providing valid informed
consent, the nature of this situation complicates this issue consider-
ably.30 Assuming Alice is now more symptomatic, perhaps even to
the point of incompetence, her decision to withdraw might plausi-
bly be viewed as an incompetent decision and should perhaps be
ignored by study personnel. If the investigators were to accede to
Alice's now-incompetent request to terminate study participation,
they would essentially be overriding the preferences of a compe-
tent decision maker (Alice at the time she provided consent), in
favor of an incompetent one (Alice in her present, symptomatic
state). Hence, while ethics might dictate that Alice be allowed to
withdraw, the law could very well be interpreted to require the op-
posite. In the present case, the parents' request that Alice's partici-
pation in the study be terminated should be respected. Even
though Alice herself may not be competent to decide whether to
terminate her participation, her parents would probably be the par-
ties seeking legal remedies for malpractice or mistreatment on her
behalf.
The conflict between the previously expressed wishes of a com-
petent individual and the current wishes of an incompetent one are
even clearer in a situation where the consent issues have been re-
versed, although the likely outcome is quite different. Imagine that
Alice, while competent, had refused to participate in the research
study after being informed of the risks and benefits of the study.
Then, after her condition had deteriorated, and with the continued
pressure from either her family or the research investigators, Alice
changed her mind and agreed to participate in the study that she
had previously refused. It is hard to imagine any clinician, lawyer,
or ethicist accepting this consent as a valid change of heart. In-
stead, the investigators would be seen as highly unethical for hav-
ing manipulated an incompetent individual into agreeing to
30. The National Bioethics Advisory Council ("NBAC"), convened by President
Clinton, specifically recommended that any incompetent person be given the opportu-
nity to refuse research participation even if she have been deemed incompetent and a
legally-appointed surrogate has consented. This recommendation emphasizes the im-
portance of "assent," whereby even incompetent persons must be willing to partici-
pate in research. The recommendations of the NBAC, while influential for many
ethicists, have no formal legal standard and have not been adopted by any agency.
The NBAC was a purely advisory committee whose commission ended on October 3,
2001. See Nat'l Bioethics Advisory Comm'n, (Oct. 20, 1999), available at http://
www.georgetown.edu/research/nrcbl/nbac/about/nbaccharter.pdf; see also http://
www.georgetown.edu/research/nrcbl/nbac/ (announcing Commission's and the char-
ter's expiration date).
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participate in a research study.31 In sum, although this vignette has
a number of elements that would concern most ethicists, the essen-
tial elements of this case are relatively clear. Although compe-
tence is a variable quality that often waxes and wanes with the
symptoms of a mental disorder, a competent individual's consent is
typically considered to be lasting, even after an individual's mental
state has deteriorated to the point where she is no longer able to
make rational treatment decisions.32
B. Case Two-Coercion and Competence,
The second vignette is in many ways clearer, but nevertheless
raises a number of important psycho-legal issues. To begin with, it
is important to reiterate the distinction between a clinical assess-
ment of incapacity and a legal determination of incompetence.33
This vignette describes a man, John, with mild mental retardation
who has refused to participate in a research trial of a new anti-
aggressive drug. The issue of whether John's refusal is legally valid
hinges on his competence to make medical treatment decisions.34
Since competence to make treatment decisions is a legal determi-
nation, John either is or is not legally authorized to make this deci-
sion for himself.35 However, it is more likely that the issue of
John's competence has never been adjudicated and he is simply
permitted to make decisions for himself, provided he agrees with
the recommendations of his doctors.36 If the latter scenario ap-
plies, then presumably the first step in this process would entail a
clinical evaluation of John's decision making capacity. The specific
methods for conducting this analysis are beyond the scope of this
commentary. The methods essentially involve assessing the extent
to which he understands the relevant risks and potential benefits of
31. The investigators may also be legally liable for any damages caused by Alice's
subsequent participation in the research study if they accept Alice's "change of heart"
when she is clearly not competent to make such a decision.
32. Some prominent writers have suggested that an ongoing assessment of compe-
tence is appropriate whenever decisional capacity is likely to fluctuate (Nat'l Inst. of
Health, Research Involving Individuals with Questionable Capacity to Consent:
Points to Consider, at http://grants.nih.gov/grants/policy/questionablecapacity.htm,
(last visited Oct. 7, 2002)), but this suggestion is neither supported by case law, nor
generally accepted by medical ethicists or legal scholars.
33. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
34. MELTON ET AL., supra note 7, at 308 (citing Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113,
135-36 (1990)).
35. John's competence to make such decisions depends on whether he is found
legally competent in a civil proceeding. MELTON ET AL., supra note 7, at 350.
36. See id. at 347.
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the proposed treatment, as well as the risks and benefits of alterna-
tives, whether he appreciates the implications of the decision, and
is able to make a reasoned choice that is logically consistent with
his values and goals.37 Although the ultimate determination will be
made by a judge, the legal decision will undoubtedly be heavily
influenced by the opinion of a clinical psychologist or psychiatrist
who has evaluated John's decision making capacity. However,
once a decision has been reached as to John's competence, the le-
gal issues become much simpler.
If John is not found competent, his consent is really not the cen-
tral issue.38 The decision as to whether he can be enrolled in the
study would rest with his appointed surrogate decision maker (typi-
cally a family member or independent third party). If the surro-
gate decision maker gave their consent despite John's objection,39
then yet another dilemma would emerge whereby the refusal of the
incompetent patient was being overruled. Arguably, despite the
frequent deference given to the wishes of even incompetent indi-
viduals, this situation might be one in which John's objection could
be overruled simply because of the "stakes" involved in this
decision.40
However, assuming that John is considered competent to make
this treatment decision, his refusal would have to be considered
valid despite the possible negative repercussions from continued
aggressive behavior.41 Further, in this scenario, the intimation that
John would lose his placement in a residential facility because he
refused to consider unproven, possibly unhelpful, research medica-
tions raises obvious ethical issues. Although John can certainly be
removed from a residence because of inappropriate behaviors,
framing a research study in this context suggests a clear use of co-
ercion to influence this decision process which is obviously in viola-
tion of the informed consent standard.42
37. See GRIsSO & APPELBAUM, supra note 10, at 7; see also PRESIDENT'S COMM'N
FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBS. IN MED. & BIOMED. & BEHAV. RES., MAKING
HEALTH CARE DECISIONS: THE ETHICAL AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF INFORMED
CONSENT IN THE PATIENT-PRACTITIONER RELATIONSHIP 17-23 (1982).
38. But see supra note 31 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of
assent in situations where an incompetent person is participating in experimental
research).
39. Hopefully, the surrogate decision-maker would be influenced, although not
absolutely limited by, John's opinions.
40. See FADEN ET AL., supra note 2, at 16-20.
41. See MELTON ET AL., supra note 7, at 357.
42. See FADEN ET AL., supra note 2, at 337-73 (discussing coercion, manipulation,
and persuasion).
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Although legal responses to John's decisions according to his
competence or incompetence seem relatively simple, the reality of
these dilemmas are somewhat more complex. Despite John's
mental retardation, it is quite likely that his competence to make
medical treatment decisions has never been adjudicated. More
likely, John has been allowed to make decisions for himself when-
ever he agreed with the recommendations of his doctors. His com-
petence is only now being questioned because he is refusing his
doctors' recommendations. If John's condition (mild mental retar-
dation) has been essentially stable throughout his lifetime, the fact
that his decisions have previously been accepted arguably creates
de facto evidence of his competence. In other words, he should be
considered competent to make decisions that do not conform to his
doctors' recommendations because his treating clinicians have al-
ways presumed him to be competent. Nevertheless, regardless of
the history behind John's prior decisions, if his competence has not
been previously adjudicated and is now being questioned legally,
the starting point must be with a clinical evaluation of his decision-
making capacity, and only after this evaluation has been completed
will the outcome of the situation be clear.43 Importantly, under no
circumstance does the residence supervisor have any authority to
make decisions on John's behalf.44
C. Case Three-Advance Directives for Research
The third vignette is perhaps the most complex, in part because
of the legal ambiguity of the advance directives 45 for research. In
this scenario, Nina, an elderly woman with Alzheimer's disease has
specified in her "living will" that she prefers to participate in any
research study that might offer some hope of benefit. Although
advance directives for treatment (or the refusal of treatment) are
43. See GRISSO & APPELBAUM, supra note 10; see also MELTON ET AL., supra note
7, at 356-58.
44. See GRISSO & APPELBAUM, supra note 10; see also MELTON ET AL., supra note
7, at 356-58.
45. Advanced directives are documents signed by a competent person giving di-
rection to health care providers about treatment choices in certain circumstances.
There are two types of advanced directives. The first type, the durable power of at-
torney for health care ("durable power"), allows the patient to name a "patient advo-
cate" to act for her and carry out her wishes. The second type, a living will, allows the
patient to state her wishes in writing, but does not name a patient advocate. Univ. of
Mich. Health Care Sys., Legal Concerns: Advance Directives/Living Wills, available at
http://www.med.umich.edu/llibr/topics/lega06.htm (last visited Sept. 15, 2002).
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well established and widely utilized,4 6 the status of advance direc-
tives for research is more equivocal. Whereas advance directives
for treatment can specify with some degree of clarity what the
treatment in question entails, few research studies are known far
enough in advance to enable a prospective subject to provide in-
formed consent to a specific study. Instead, advance directives for
research typically provide somewhat ambiguous guidance for a sur-
rogate decision-maker, informing them merely of the disabled per-
son's willingness to participate in research in general or a particular
type of research. Although the vignette does not indicate whether
Nina's advance directive specified her interest in participating in
the type of research currently at issue, the legitimacy of her ad-
vance directive is, at best, questionable. As a result, Nina's chil-
dren are certainly within their authority to challenge Nina's
advance directive.
However, Nina's advance directive would not likely be at issue
until after her condition had deteriorated to the point of incompe-
tence. At that time, a surrogate decision-maker would have to be
appointed to make decisions on Nina's behalf.4 7 In most instances,
Nina's children would be appointed as surrogate decision-makers,
but the possibility also exists that a third party might be appointed.
In either case, the standard for guiding the proxy's decisions will
differ depending on the jurisdiction. Some states apply the "best
interest" standard, in which decisions are supposed to reflect the
patient's best interest.48 Other states apply a "substitute judg-
ment" standard in which decisions are intended to replicate the de-
cision the patient would have made.4 9 Although judges in a
jurisdiction following the substitute judgment standard would give
Nina's advance directive considerable weight, her wishes might
also be influential in a jurisdiction following a best interest
standard.
It is also possible that a judge could consider Nina's advance di-
rective to be valid. Even so, her children might still challenge the
appropriateness of any particular research study by arguing that
46. Seventy-five percent of Americans are in favor of advanced directives. In fact,
twenty-five to thirty percent of Americans have actually prepared an advanced direc-
tive. US Living Will Registry, U.S. Living Will Registry Fact Sheets, available at http://
www.uslivingwillregistry.com/factsheet.shtm (last visited Oct. 30, 2002).
47. ALAN MEISEL, THE RIGHT TO DIE § 10.7 (2d ed. 1989).
48. See Conservatorship of Drabick, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840, 852-53 (Cal. Ct. App.
1988).
49. For further discussion and analysis on the "substitute judgment" standard, see
In re Fiori, 652 A.2d 1350, 1371 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995).
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their mother would not have consented to that particular study
were she still competent. Again, as the individuals most familiar
with Nina's personal preferences and values, her children's opin-
ions would weigh heavily in any decision regarding what Nina
would have wanted were she still competent. Ultimately, however,
the preferences of Nina's children have relatively little legal au-
thority unless they are formally appointed as surrogate decision-
makers." Thus, knowing that her children are opposed to her ad-
vance directive, Nina would probably be better served by specify-
ing a health care proxy in advance. A health care proxy would
most likely insure that her wishes are carried out after her mental
state has declined."'
However, even in a scenario in which Nina's children have essen-
tially no legal standing, their opinions might nevertheless dictate
treatment simply because of their presence and vocal opposition.
Physicians and researchers are often reluctant to challenge family
members who are adamantly opposed to a course of action because
of the fear of possible litigation. Clinicians are often more behold-
ing to individuals who are present and vocal (and potentially litig-
ious if ignored) than they are to written dictates of questionable
authority. Thus, although the legal authority of Nina's children
may be questionable or non-existent in the present scenario, their
influence might nevertheless be substantial.
SUMMARY
The scenarios described above highlight a number of important
issues in which psychology, ethics, and the law intersect. First, all
three scenarios illustrate the difference between legal authority
and practical reality. Family members often have less legal stand-
ing than they would like, and are often unhappy with the limita-
tions of their authority. Furthermore, their influence is often far
more substantial than their legal standing would suggest. Fear of
litigation or claims of unethical practice can dwarf the privileges of
legal authority. In addition, although the principals of autonomy
guide many of the decisions made on behalf of incompetent indi-
viduals, balancing the need to preserve autonomy with the desire
to protect incompetent decision-makers is fraught with difficulties.
Researchers studying individuals of questionable competence have
both an ethical and legal obligation to insure that their subjects
50. See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
51. See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
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have received adequate protection. Researchers must support the
decision making authority of a competent individual and protect
that individual against abuses when they are not.
I p .
